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1. The State of the Art 
The issue of the relationship between our cogitative abilities, in particular the abil-
ity of thinking about something that does not exist, and modal characteristics, in 
particular those featuring unactualized (im)possibilities, i.e., the ways the world 
might (not) have been, has always been very intricate. 
In analytic philosophy, reflection on this matter has started by reviving an 
optimistic thesis traditionally ascribed to Hume, according to which conceivabil-
ity entails possibility: if something is conceivable, then it is also possible. As Witt-
genstein clearly suggests in the incipit of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, where 
he says that that there is no room for conceptions of something impossible: 
 
The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but 
to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should 
have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able 
to think what cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in lan-
guage and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense. 
 
On the one hand, the Humean thesis seems quite reasonable. What can be 
the source of our notion of an unactualized possibility, if not our capacity of con-
ceiving viz. imagining, at least in the sense of imagining which for Hume seemed 
to be synonymous with conceiving itself (a nonsensuous imagining),1 how things 
would have been differently from how they actually are? Yet on the other hand, 
our imaginative capacities seem well to exceed the realm of the unactualized pos-
sible. As Priest (20162) has reminded us with the story of Sylvan’s box, which is 
both empty and full at one and the same time, fiction is plenty of descriptions of 
situations that might not have obtained. 
In (1971, 1980) Kripke seems to have definitely relinquished optimism by 
drawing a distinction between an epistemic notion of possibility, what is possible 
according to one’s state of knowledge, and a metaphysical notion of possibility, 
how things might have really been in the world. For, he says, there are many 
things that are epistemically possible but not metaphysically possible. For in-
stance, for all what ancients did know, it was surely possible that Hesperus is not 
identical with Phosphorus. Yet clearly enough, this nonidentity does not amount 
	  
1 Cf. Szabo Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 17. 
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to a metaphysical possibility. Hesperus, viz. Venus, might have been different in 
many ways from what it actually is—for instance, it might have orbited closer to 
the Sun—but it might not have been different from Phosphorus, if this means the 
impossible eventuality for Venus to be different from itself. 2  Granted, adds 
Kripke, an epistemic possibility corresponds (if not amounts) to a certain sort of 
metaphysical possibility. In the Hesperus/Phosphorus case, the epistemic possi-
bility that Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus corresponds to the meta-
physical possibility that a given subject be in the same kind of mental states she 
actually entertains when she faces Venus at dusk and Venus at dawn respectively 
and yet face different celestial bodies, a certain Hesperean planet and another 
Phosphorean planet respectively.3 Yet that metaphysical possibility is not the met-
aphysical possibility that Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus, for there is 
no such possibility. As a result, there is a sense according to which what we can 
conceive—an epistemic possibility—is not a metaphysical possibility, so that the 
Humean thesis does not hold across the board. 
To be sure, one may interpret Kripke’s notion of an epistemic possibility as 
displaying a mere illusion of conceivability. When it seems to us that Hesperus 
might not have been identical with Phosphorus, it also seems to us that we are 
conceiving such an (epistemically) possible situation, but in point of fact we are 
wrong: we are not conceiving that situation, at most we are conceiving another 
situation that indeed is metaphysically possible, namely the aforementioned situ-
ation in which we are in the same mental states as we actually are and yet we face 
different celestial bodies.4 If this were the case, clearly enough the entailment be-
tween conceivability and possibility could be saved. Yet, even if one may admit 
that we are not infallible as to what we can conceive, it is hardly the case that this 
interpretation can be generalized to all cases of seeming conceivability. Some-
times at least, when we seem to conceive something—for instance, when we seem 
to think that there are no numbers, as an evil demon may lead us into mumbling—
we do conceive that very something, even if it is not possible; we are hardly con-
sidering the possibility that there are pseudonumbers.5 Thus, it is better to say, as 
some have maintained,6 that an epistemic possibility in general is an illusion of 
possibility, i.e., the fact that non-P seems possible when in point of fact it is not, 
for P is instead necessary. 
Going in the same direction, following Chalmers one may draw a distinction 
between a negative sense of conceivability, according to which something is con-
ceivable “when it is not ruled out a priori” (Chalmers 2002: 149), and a positive 
sense of conceivability, which, by relying on some (again nonphenomenal, in par-
ticular nonsensuous) form of imagination, “require that one can form some sort 
of positive conception of a situation in which [something] is the case” (ibid. 150). 
The point of such a distinction is precisely to restore a sense of conceivability for 
	  
2 For an alternative account according to which for Hesperus not to be the same as Phos-
phorus counts as a genuine metaphysical possibility insofar as it does not amount to the 
impossible eventuality that Venus is different from itself, cf. Voltolini 2014. 
3 Cf. Kripke 1971: 157 fn.15, 1980: 103-104, 143. 
4 Cf. Di Francesco and Tomasetta 2014: 195. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Cf. Szabo Gendler and Hawthorne 2002: 33. 
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which Hume’s thesis holds. At most, negative conceivability entails logical possi-
bility, the mere noncontradictoriety of a certain imagined situation. Yet it does 
not entail metaphysical possibility, which is rather what positive conceivability 
opens the way to. We cannot follow here the details by means of which such a 
move may be developed, which involve endorsing some form of semantic bidi-
mensionalism, according to which expressions have two forms of intensions, a 
primary and a secondary one, which in the cases where conceivability really en-
tails metaphysical possibility collapse.7 Yet even if this move were successful, it 
remains that there is a residual form of conceivability for which, pace Humeans, 
the entailment to a genuine form of possibility is prevented. 
So far, so good, Meinongians of all sorts may say. In actual fact, they hasten 
to add, even the entailment from a sense of conceivability to logical possibility is 
to be questioned, for contradictory situations are clearly conceivable. Those who 
are interested in giving a modal twist to Meinongianism will indeed say that, 
along with possible states of affairs, hence possible worlds, there also are impos-
sible states of affairs, hence impossible worlds, those where contradictory situa-
tions hold. Along with ways the world might have been, there indeed are also 
ways the world might not have been.8 Those latter ways correspond to what is 
conceived but it is not possible, for it precisely subsists in some of the latter 
worlds.9 To be sure, this move does not please all those who believe that ontology 
should not be inflated with impossible states of affairs and impossible worlds. One 
only needs a way to alternatively deal with any evidence that apparently supports 
the claim that there are impossible worlds. Yet even if one dispenses with impos-
sible worlds and states of affairs, one has still to provide an alternative account of 
how we can conceive what is not possible. 
The situation is made more difficult by the fact that there seem to be not only 
impossible states of affairs, hence impossible worlds, but also impossible objects. 
Clearly enough, being committed to impossible worlds does not entail being com-
mitted to impossible objects. For even if impossible objects would exist at impos-
sible worlds, there may be impossible worlds without impossible objects, namely 
those worlds containing impossible situations made just by actual, or even merely 
possible, entities. Yet the intentionality of our thoughts seems to commit us to 
impossible objects, at least if we admit that there are nonpropositional forms of 
thoughts. Indeed, the fact that one thinks of something, or in other terms, that 
one’s thought has an intentional object, appears not to be exhausted by the fact 
that one thinks that such and such is the case.10 But if this is the case, then one has 
thoughts about not only actual, but also about possible and even impossible items, 
as in the famous example originally pointed out by Twardowski (1894) of some-
one thinking of a wooden cannon entirely made of steel at one and the same time.  
Now, if one wants to dispense with impossible objects, one has to develop 
an account of intentionality in which one explains how one can think of such 
objects even if there really are no such objects. This explanation is no easy task. 
	  
7 For such a move, cf. primarily Chalmers 2002. 
8 Cf. Yagisawa 2010. 
9 Cf. Priest 20162, Berto 2012. 
10 Cf. e.g. Crane 2001, 2013. 
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Either one has to resort to a notion of an intentional content to be traced back at 
least to Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1901), by holding that in thinking of an 
impossibile, one is merely related to an (unsatisfied) intentional content. Or one 
has to draw a distinction between the ontologically noncommittal notion of an 
object and the ontologically committal notion of an entity and say that in thinking 
of an impossibile, there is an impossible intentional object one is thinking of even 
if such an object is no entity.11 Neither move seems to be unproblematic, unless it 
is spelled out in appropriate details. What exactly is an intentional content, espe-
cially if there really is no object it relates a thinker with (does at least mental de-
scriptivism come back from the rear door)? How can there be impossible inten-
tional objects, if in the overall ontological domain there really are no such 
things?12 
These problems appear even more serious if one takes that the domain of 
objects that necessarily fails to exist is broader than what originally seemed. For 
there is a sense according to which not only impossibilia like the Twardowskian 
wooden cannon made of steel, but also fictional objects like Madame Bovary and 
Sherlock Holmes, if not all abstract objects in general (universal attributes among 
them), necessarily fail to exist.13 
This issue is intended to reconsider all these venerable problems and indicate 
possible solutions to them. We hope that these essays will advance the current 
debate about possibility and impossibility (as well as their conceptions), which 
seems to be of interest to an increasing number of researchers in various areas 
such as logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and 
metaphysics.14 
 
2. Summaries of Papers 
G. Priest, Thinking the Impossible 
By acknowledging the essential role played by possibility in Western philosophy, 
Priest focuses on its actual role in possible-world semantics and explains the move 
from a mono-modal logic to a multimodal logic (whose language contains multi-
ple possibility/necessity operators, and whose semantics contains multiple acces-
sibility relations). There is a most general notion of possibility (simply called “log-
ical possibility”) that needs to be taken into account according to which to be 
possible is to hold at some world, and anything that is possible in any more re-
stricted sense should be possible in this sense. Priest concentrates next on the re-
lation between impossible worlds and possible world semantics by examining two 
	  
11 For the second move see Smith 2002, Crane 2001, 2013, Sainsbury 2010, Sainsbury and 
Tye 2012. Sainsbury (this issue) returns to it in great detail. Actually, these two moves are 
not incompatible. 
12 For some such problems, cf. Voltolini 2016. 
13 On this, see Kripke 2013 and Zalta 1983, 1989 respectively. 
14 “Thinking the (Im)possible” was also the title of the FINO/SIFA Graduate Confer-
ence that took place in Turin on June 29-30, 2015. On that occasion we started discussing 
on these problems with some prestigious experts such as M. Sainsbury, G. Priest and T. 
Williamson together with many researchers and students. After those fruitful discussions 
we got to like this topic more and more, which prompted us to edit an issue of Argumenta 
on these themes. 
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different directives, the primary (“Everything holds at some worlds, and every-
thing fails at some worlds”) and the secondary (“If A and B are distinct formulas, 
there are worlds where A holds and B fails”) one. The final part of the paper is 
dedicated to the comparison between conceivability and possibility, where con-
ceiving (considered as the same as imagining) is seen—differently from the Humean 
proposal according to which what is conceivable is somehow possible—as the 
mere bringing before the mind of a particular state of affairs, even of an impossible 
one. Then he answers three possible objections against the idea of conceiving im-
possibilities and concludes that the impossible shouldn’t be marginalized but un-
derstood in its big potential. 
 
T. Williamson, Counterpossibles in Semantics and Metaphysics 
The paper focuses on counterpossibles, which are counterfactual conditionals 
with impossible antecedents such as “If whales were fish, their behaviour would 
differ from what it actually is” or “If whales were fish, their behaviour would be 
just as it actually is”. According to semantic orthodoxy all counterpossibles are 
true, therefore the above two counterpossibles should be seen as true, and not as 
genuine alternatives as they seem. Williamson asks whether orthodoxy about 
counterpossibles is correct and, by defending orthodoxy against recent objections, 
shows how that kind of questions, far from being a negligible small point of the 
logic and semantics of counterfactuals, has important ramifications in several di-
rections.  
 
L. Estrada-González, Impossible Worlds and the Intensional Sense of ‘And’ 
The essay shows why in an argument like that offered by Lewis against concrete 
impossible worlds the extensionality of ‘and’ is an assumption that can be coher-
ently challenged and rejected. Estrada-Gonzales starts by explaining why, inde-
pendently from Lewis’ argument, ‘and’ is in general intensional and then answers 
some possible objections. Later on he presents an allegedly ‘and’-free argument 
against impossible worlds which is still subject to well-known objections to the 
extensionality of ‘not’. Then he shows that the reasons to support the intensional 
‘not’ blocking that argument belong to the same family of reasons to support the 
intensional ‘and’. Estrada-Gonzales concludes by claiming that intensional ‘and’ 
is needed as a premise-binder and that the argument is blocked at a stage prior to 
the steps about negation. 
 
T. Yagisawa, S4 to 5D 
The paper focuses on the modal logic axiom 4, if necessarily P, then necessarily nec-
essarily P. According to Chandler (1976) and Salmon (1981, 1989), there is trouble 
with S4. Axiom 4 is equivalent to if possibly possibly p, then possibly p which requires 
that the accessibility relation between worlds be transitive. Chandler’s and 
Salmon’s argument against axiom 4 is based on the idea that even if an ordinary 
object could have had a slightly different origin from the one it actually has, it 
could not have had a very different origin from its actual one. Hence, they con-
clude that accessibility is not transitive, i.e., that what is possibly possible may not 
be possible. Yagisawa’s move is to propose a different way to save axiom 4: by 
supporting five-dimensionalism, he preserves both axiom 4 and absolute possibil-
ity by postulating objects as extended not only in physical space-time but in logical 
space as well.  
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V. Morato, World Stories and Maximality 
The paper deals with the actualist conceptions of modality that reduce talk about 
possible worlds to talk about world stories. Such conceptions have classical prob-
lems, namely that of representing the possible existence of non-actual objects, and 
that of expressing, in an actualistic way, the possible nonexistence of actual ob-
jects. Morato finds a way out of problems of this sort. He suggests that we aban-
don the notion of global maximality in favor of the notion of local maximality, 
thanks to which we could generate world stories where the possible nonexistence 
of an object is represented by the lack of any proposition having it as a constituent. 
Such world stories would also be locally maximal in the sense of being complete 
descriptions of alternative courses of actuality. 
 
C. Nencha, Natural Properties Do Not Support Essentialism in Counterpart Theory: A 
Reflection on Buras’s Proposal 
The paper is a defence of Lewis’ antiessentialism against Buras’ view (2006). Ac-
cording to Buras, if Lewis accepts both counterpart theory and natural properties, 
then he can no longer be an antiessentialist: for natural properties determine the 
existence of similarity relations among individuals that are relevant inde-
pendently of the ways those individuals are represented, therefore individuals do 
have real essential properties. Nencha’s argument is that the implications of coun-
terpart theory for essentialism are not altered by the acknowledgement of natural 
properties, since if counterpart theory is antiessentialist without natural proper-
ties, then it remains so also when natural properties are taken into account. 
 
M. Jago, Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions 
The paper outlines an account of propositions as sets of truthmakers, along the 
lines suggested by Fine (2014 a, b, 2016). According to Jago, propositions are to 
be seen as sets of possible truthmakers, thanks to which he succeeds in offering a 
redescription of semantic phenomena such as same-saying, subject matter, and 
aboutness. 
 
N. Spinelli, Husserlian Intentionality and Contingent Universals 
Spinelli starts from Husserl’s challenge of maintaining both that universals exist 
in the strongest sense and that they exist contingently. After a short presentation 
of Husserl’s intentionalism, idealism and the role played by universals, he then 
presents a version of the Husserlian view regimented in terms of modal logic and 
possible-worlds semantics and distinguishes between two accessibility relations, 
world-bound and free, having different structural properties. Thanks to his modal 
apparatus, he is able to show how the necessary or the contingent existence of 
universals can be derived. Therefore, he concludes that in Husserl’s philosophy 
there is room for both necessary and contingent universals. 
 
M. Sainsbury, Intentional Relations 
The paper focuses on a classical topic concerning intentionality that could be 
summed up by the following question: what kind of relation is the intentional 
relation? Is it a two-term relation or a three-term relation? Sainsbury starts from 
the intuition that, on the one hand, thinking about Obama and thinking about 
Pegasus seem to be the same kind of thing (since both are cases of thinking about 
something), but, on the other hand, they also seem to be different kinds of thing 
because the first kind of thinking seems to be relational whereas the other does 
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not. The essay aims at offering a solution to this kind of problems by distinguish-
ing varieties of relationality and by underlining that what matters is the two-term 
relational nature of all intentional states, regardless of whether or not the repre-
sentations they involve have referents. 
 
 
References 
 
Berto, F. 2012, Existence as a Real Property, Dordrecht: Springer. 
Buras, T. 2006, “Counterpart Theory, Natural Properties and Essentialism”, Journal 
of Philosophy, 103, 27-42. 
Chalmers, D. 2002, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?”, in Szabo Gendler, T. 
and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 145-200. 
Chandler, H.S. 1976, “Plantinga and the Contingently Possible”, Analysis, 36: 106-109. 
Crane, T. 2001, Elements of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Crane, T. 2013, The Objects of Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Di Francesco, M. and Tomasetta, A. 2014, “Immaginare e sperimentare. Gli zombie 
e il problema della coscienza fenomenica”, Rivista di estetica, 56, 179-208. 
Fine, K. 2014a, “A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction 
and Negation”, Unpublished manuscript. 
Fine, K. 2014b, “A Theory of Truth-Conditional Content II: Subject-matter, Com-
mon Content, Remainder and Ground”, Unpublished manuscript. 
Fine, K. 2016, “Angelic Content”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45, 199-226. 
Husserl, E. 1901, Logical Investigations, London: Routledge, 2001. 
Kripke, S. 1971, “Identity and Necessity”, in Munitz, M.K. (ed.), Identity and Individ-
uation, New York: New York University Press, 135-64. 
Kripke, S. 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kripke, S. 2013, Reference and Existence, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Priest, G. 20162, Towards Non-Being, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sainsbury, M. 2010, “Intentionality Without Exotica”, in Jeshion, R. (ed.), New Es-
says on Singular Thoughts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 300-17. 
Sainsbury, M. and Tye, M. 2012, Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
Salmon, N. 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Salmon, N. 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, The Philosophical Review, 
98, 3-34. 
Smith, A.D. 2002, The Problem of Perception, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 
Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. 2002, “Introduction: Conceivability and Possi-
bility”, in Szabo Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-70. 
Twardowski, K. 1894, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, Munich: 
Philosophia, 1982. 
Voltolini, A. 2014, “Contingent Sameness and Necessary Identity”, in Palma, A. 
(ed.), Castañeda and His Guises, Berlin: De Gruyter, 197-211. 
Carola Barbero, Andrea Iacona, Alberto Voltolini 
	  
180 
Voltolini, A. 2016, “Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought”, Dialectica, 70, 245-52. 
Wittgenstein, L. 2012, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Routledge. 
Yagisawa, T. 2010, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Zalta, E.N. 1983, Abstract Objects, Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Zalta, E.N. 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge 
(MA): The MIT Press. 
